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1. Introduction 
The question "How did language evolve?" has generally been taken to be about the 
identity and properties of the processes by which linguistic entities or their features 
evolved. And, on various accounts, a particular family of processes – referred to as 
"preadaptation", "exaptation", "reappropriation" or "co-optation" – was central to 
some phase in the evolution of language. These processes, roughly, are ones by which 
an existing structure or feature acquires a use or function for which it did not 
originally come into existence. Having acquired such a use, the structure or feature is 
accorded the evolutionary status of "exaptation". As characterized by Stephen Jay 
Gould (2002, p. 1234), an exaptation is "the evolutionary result of functional 
cooptation from a different source of origin". More technically, "[a]n exaptation is a 
trait of a population or larger taxonomic unit, than confers performance advantage in a 
particular way at a specific time but was not produced by natural selection directly for 
that use".1  
 
 
 
*This article is based on a paper presented at the Fifth International Conference on the Evolution of Language held 
on 31 March – 3 April 2004 in Leipzig. 
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In this article, I aim to examine the way in which linguistic entities or their 
prelinguistic bases have been assigned the evolutionary status of "exaptations" in 
some highly rated accounts of language evolution. I will argue that these status 
assignments are problematic in not being underpinned by a restrictive general theory 
of exaptation.  And I will show how the lack of such a theory contributes to the 
paucity of the factual evidence bearing on accounts of language evolution.  
 
 
2. Exaptationist accounts 
Let us begin by considering four specimens of accounts on which certain linguistic 
entities or some of their features arose through a process of exaptation. The first – and 
oldest – specimen is Philip Lieberman's (1990, 1991, 1995) model on which 
preadaptation played two roles in language evolution. These roles are specified in 
(1)(a) and (1)(b). 
 
(1) (a) The brain mechanisms that control speech production evolved by 
preadaptation – i.e., exaptation – from brain mechanisms that 
facilitated precise one-handed manual tasks. (Lieberman, 1991, p.4) 
 (b) The brain mechanisms that handle syntactic sequencing evolved by 
preadaptation – i.e., exaptation – from the brain mechanisms that 
controlled speech production. (Lieberman, 1991, pp. 4, 107-108) 
 
These two roles of preadaptation are represented by arrows (a) and (b) in the 
schematic representation offered in (2) of Lieberman's more comprehensive model of 
language evolution. 
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Lieberman's Preadaptationist Model 
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The second specimen account is Jenny Wilkins and Wendy Wakefield's (1995, 1996) 
scenario of the origin of the neuroanatomical structures that underlie linguistic ability. 
On this scenario, reappropriation – their term for exaptation – played the role 
specified in (3) in the origin of these structures. 
 
(3) The neuroanatomical structures associated with Broca's area and the POT – 
the junction of the parietal, occipital and temporal lobes of the brain – that 
(initially) had a motor function were reappropriated – i.e., exapted – for the 
new function of processing sensory input into conceptual structures. (Wilkins 
and Wakefield, 1995, p. 175) 
 
The role assigned to Wilkins and Wakefield to reappropriation is represented by 
arrow (b) in the schematic representation offered in (4) of Wilkins and Wakefield's 
reappropriationist scenario. 
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Wilkins and Wakefield's Reappropriationist Scenario 
 
The third specimen is a theory by William Calvin and Derek Bickerton (2000) on 
which exaptation played a role in the evolutionary development of structured strings 
of words. The central exaptationist claim of this theory is represented as (5). 
 
(5) A social calculus provided for the categories of AGENT, THEME and GOAL 
– also referred to as "thematic roles" – and these categories were exapted to 
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produce a basis for sentence structures that include arguments. (Calvin and 
Bickerton, 2000, pp. 136-137) 
 
The role assigned by Calvin and Bickerton to exaptation is represented schematically 
by arrow (a) in schema (6).  
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Calvin and Bickerton's Exaptationist Theory 
 
The fourth and final specimen of an exaptationist account of language evolution to be 
considered in this article is Andrew Carstairs-McCarthy's co-optationist scenario. On 
this scenario, co-optation – his term for exaptation – played the role in the origin of 
syntax specified in (7). 
 
(7) The neural organization underlying syllable structure was co-opted – i.e., 
exapted – to provide a syntax for strings of "words". (Carstairs-McCarthy, 
1999, pp. 147-148) 
 
This role of co-optation is represented by arrow (a) in the schematic representation 
given in (8) of Carstairs-McCarthy's scenario of language evolution.  
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3. Assumptions about exaptation 
Assigning entities a particular evolutionary status, of course, cannot be an exercise in 
stipulation. This applies to claims (1), (3), (5) and (7) as well. To be able to assign the 
linguistic entities in question the status of "exaptation" one should, on the one hand, 
have a theory of the properties by which exaptations are distinguished from entities 
that evolved by other evolutionary processes – in particular by natural selection. On 
the other hand, one should be able to furnish evidence indicating that the linguistic 
entities in question do have these distinctive properties. 
 
A first question that arises in this regard about claims (1), (3), (5) and (7), then, is: 
What is the general theory of exaptation by which they are underpinned? The short 
answer is that none of the four exaptationist accounts draws on an explicitly 
articulated general theory of exaptation. Lieberman (1990, p. 742) as well as Wilkins 
and Wakefield (1995, p. 162) do refer in this connection in a general way to Darwin's 
concept of "preadaptation". But they don't derive from it a theory of exaptation which 
(a) clearly articulates the properties that are distinctive of exaptations or (b) draws a 
distinction between different kinds of exaptations. As for Calvin and Bickerton, and 
Carstairs-McCarthy, they make no explicit reference to Darwin's concept of 
"preadaptation". Strangely, the theory of exaptation developed by Stephen Jay Gould 
and Elisabeth Vrba from Darwin's observations on preadaptation does not feature in 
any of the four specimen accounts.2  
 
But perhaps it is wrong to require that exaptationist claims such as (1), (3), (5), (7) be 
underpinned by an explicit theory of exaptation. Perhaps, in appraising such claims, 
one should read between the lines, as it were, and attempt to reconstruct the implicit 
assumptions about exaptation presupposed by these claims. Perhaps, when made 
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explicit, these assumptions might even be found to add up to the required theory of 
exaptation. 
 
An attempt at reconstructing the assumptions about exaptation made implicitly by 
Lieberman, Wilkins and Wakefield, Calvin and Bickerton and Carstairs-McCarthy 
yield assumptions such as (9) – (12). 
 
(9) Preadaptation is the evolutionary process by which an organ originally 
constructed for one purpose may be converted into one with a wholly different 
purpose. (Lieberman, 1975, p.3; 1990, p. 742) 
 
(10) Reappropriation is a process that takes a moment only. (Wilkins and 
Wakefield, 1995, p. 162) 
 
(11) In exaptation, there are no intermediate stages in the evolution of the entity in 
question. (Bickerton, 1998, p. 354) 
 
(12) An entity X – e.g., a syntax for strings of "words" – can be assigned the 
evolutionary status of "co-optation" if there are close parallels between the 
structure of X and the structure of a precursor entity Y (e.g., syllable 
structure). (Carstairs-McCarthy, 1999, pp. 151ff.) 
 
Of the four accounts, Carstairs-McCarthy's is the richest in regard to implicit 
assumptions about what exaptations are. In this paper I can consider assumption (12) 
only; in a recent book, Unravelling the Evolution of Language (= Botha, 2003), I 
analyze some of the other assumptions made by Carstairs-McCarthy about what 
exaptations are.  
 
 
4. Shortcoming of the assumptions 
The question, then, is whether assumptions such as (9) – (12) are fit to serve as a basis 
on which a linguistic entity can be accorded or denied the status of "exaptation". On 
my analysis, these assumptions fail a minimal condition of adequacy – one adopted in 
work on exaptation that was done by Gould and Vrba as well as by some of their 
followers and critics. This condition can be stated as (13). 
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(13) Assumptions (or theories) about what exaptations are need to be restrictive. 
 
Condition (13) requires that the assumptions in question should make it possible to 
discriminate in a non-arbitrary way between entities that are exaptations and entities 
that are not exaptations, in particular entities that are adaptations. Such discrimination 
is possible only if the distinctive properties of exaptations are characterized with a 
high degree of preciseness. 
 
Returning to assumptions (9) – (12), they do not meet the condition of restrictiveness. 
This is so because they are not framed in terms of concepts that capture the distinctive 
properties of exaptations in a sufficiently determinate way. Within the confines of his 
paper, I can flesh out this point with reference to two of these assumptions only. The 
first is Lieberman's assumption stated as (9). The question arising in connection with 
this assumption is: How much must the new purpose of an organ differ from its 
original purpose for it to be a wholly different purpose? To see what this question is 
about, three things should be noted: First, the brain mechanisms involved in manual 
control are used for the purpose of sequencing: sequencing of movements carried out 
in performing one-handed manual tasks. Second, the brain mechanisms involved in 
speech production are used for the purpose of sequencing as well: sequencing of 
articulatory actions. Third, the brain mechanisms involved in syntax, likewise, are 
used for the purpose of sequencing: sequencing of words in a sentence. 
 
So the question is: Why should the brain mechanisms at issue not be taken as being 
used for fundamentally the same purpose, namely sequencing? The problem is that it 
is not clear how much one purpose has to differ from another to be a "wholly new 
purpose". This means that the Darwinian notion of a "wholly new purpose" invoked 
by Lieberman is not sufficiently determined. As a consequence, assumption (9) does 
not offer a basis for discriminating in a non-arbitrary way between a structure that is 
an exaptation and one that is an adaptation. The general point has been clarified in a 
concrete way by Hudson Reeve and Paul Sherman (1993, p. 3) in their critique of 
Gould and Vrba's theory of exaptation. They illustrate it with reference to the 
evolutionary status of the human ear bones, asking whether these bones are 
exaptations because, in addition to their original function, they now mediate social 
communication via telephones. According to Reeve and Sherman, the answer depends 
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on how finely one subdivides roles or functions. If the original function is broadly 
defined – say, as that of facilitating the detection of acoustic stimuli – then human ear 
bones are adaptations. If however this function is narrowly defined – say, as that of 
facilitating the detection of pre-Bell or prelinguistic acoustic stimuli – then our ear 
bones are exaptations. 
 
Let us next consider Carstairs-McCarthy's assumption (12) about what exaptations 
are. The problematic notion here is that of a "close parallel" between two structures. 
The question is: How close should the parallel be for the structures to be related by 
exaptation? Interestingly, Fritz Newmeyer (2000, p. 389) has argued in this regard 
that the structural parallels between syllable structure and syntactic structure 
identified by Carstairs-McCarthy are not sufficiently close. In phonological structure, 
for example, there is nothing that, in Newmeyer's view, closely parallels the lexical 
categories N, V, P and A. So, the question arises: Are the structural parallels between 
phonological structure and syntactic structure close enough to justify assigning 
syntactic structure the evolutionary status of "exaptation", as is done by Carstairs-
McCarthy? His notion of a "close parallel" is simply not precise enough to allow one 
to use assumption (12) for discriminating between entities that are exaptations and 
entities that are not. An additional problem with assumption (12) is that it is ad hoc: 
Carstairs-McCarthy refrains from showing – as one should do – that the essence of 
this assumption generalizes to other, nonlinguistic, entities that may be evolutionarily 
related by exaptation. 
 
The assumptions made by Lieberman and Carstairs-McCarthy about exaptations are 
not unique in being insufficiently restrictive. In this respect, they are representative of 
the assumptions presupposed by many exaptationist accounts of language evolution, a 
point argued in some detail in the book (= Botha, 2003) referred to above. 
 
 
5. Restrictiveness and evidential paucity 
The point, then, is that to be able to discriminate in an account of language evolution 
between entities that are exaptations and entities that have some other evolutionary 
status, more than loose assumptions of the sort of (9) – (12) are required. What is 
needed is a general theory of exaptation within which such assumptions are replaced 
by restrictive constraints on assigning exaptation status to entities. This theory has, of 
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course, to be complemented by a theory which characterizes – in an equally 
constrained way – the products of adaptation by natural selection. Indeed, on certain 
theories of evolutionary processes an entity is considered an exaptation if it lacks the 
properties of an adaptation.3  
 
This brings us to the second purpose for which a restrictive theory of exaptation is 
needed. The constraints included in such a theory are needed for determining what the 
evidence is which is required for assigning or denying linguistic entities the status of 
"exaptations". In terms of their core concepts, the constraints included in such a 
theory point to possible sources of evidence for or against exaptationist claims such as 
those expressed in (1), (3), (5) and (7). The more restrictive these constraints are, the 
more clearly they indicate what evidence would be relevant and what evidence would 
not be relevant to such status assignments. Assumptions about exaptation which are 
stated in terms of concepts that are vague, fuzzy or very general are evidentially 
indeterminate: they do not point in a relatively specific way to evidence that would be 
relevant to assigning or denying exaptation status to linguistic entities. Thus, because 
of the fact that Lieberman's assumption (9) is stated in terms of the fuzzy concept of 
"wholly different purpose", it is unclear precisely what evidence would be needed for 
assigning a linguistic entity the status of exaptation. And because Carstairs-
McCarthy's assumption (12) is stated in terms of the insufficiently restrictive concept 
of "close structural parallel", it fails in a similar way. Wilkins and Wakefield's 
assumption (10) is similarly flawed in having at its core the fuzzy concept of "a 
moment". And Calvin and Bickerton's assumption (11) is less than determinate in 
being based on the overly general notion of "no intermediate stages". 
 
To conclude: to the extent that they are restrictive, constraints on exaptation function 
as "divining rods" – devices for detecting evidence that may be relevant to assigning 
or denying exaptation status to linguistic entities. Adopting such constraints will, 
accordingly, lead to an expansion of the limited evidential basis of accounts of 
language evolution.4 
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Notes 
 
 
*This article is based on a paper presented at the Fifth International Conference on the 
Evolution of Language held on 31 March – 3 April 2004 in Leipzig. 
 
 
1. For this characterization, see Arnold (1994, p. 126). 
2. For this theory, see Gould (1991, 2002); Gould and Vrba (1982). 
3. For this point, see Arnold (1994, p. 126). 
4. I argue in some detail in Botha (2003) that work on the evolution of language 
has to draw on theories which give restrictive characterizations of various 
kinds of entities. These include –  
 (i) the linguistic entities that are believed to have undergone evolution; 
(ii) the processes – of which exaptation and adaptation are two instances – 
by which these linguistic entities might have evolved; 
(iii) the sources of data that could yield indirect evidence about aspects of 
the evolution of language; 
(iv) the nonfactual considerations that could add to or subtract from the 
scientific value or status of accounts of language evolution. 
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